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I. Research Background and Topic 
Justification  
In the present dissertation, we examined the economic 
performance of Hungary, as well as the relationship of the 
Hungarian people and the political elite to European 
integration, in the decade following the 2004 eastward 
expansion of the European Union (EU). At several points we 
embedded the analysis in a Central and Eastern European 
comparative perspective, and compared the situation in 
Hungary primarily to developments in Poland. The theoretical 
framework of the dissertation is provided by economic and 
socio-economic institutionalism, as well as the relevant 
political science and sociology literature related to European 
integration. Our goal was to contribute to scientific discourse 
primarily with conclusions drawn from new or novel links 
between economic performance and how the EU is viewed.   
* 
The role of institutions has been an established topic in the 
socio-economic discussions of recent decades (see Polányi, 
1976; Granovetter, 1990; Elster, 1995; Fligstein, 2001; North, 
1990, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2004). By institutions, we mean 
“the rules of the game in a society, (…) the humanly devised 
constraints and mechanisms that shape human interaction” 
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(North, 1990); their formation, operation and transformation 
play a relevant role in the economic and political systems. 
Institutions “matter” (North, 1990). The effect of institutions 
on longer-term economic development has become a favored 
field of study in the new wave of economics (see for example 
Acemoglu et al. 2004; Rodrik, 2013). 
* 
The relationship to European integration fundamentally 
determined the politics, economy and public discourse of 
Hungary in the quarter-century since the transition to 
democracy. Following the collapse of state socialism in 1989-
1990, the need for “Euro-Atlantic integration”, and within 
that, accession to the European Community (from 1993, the 
European Union), became a clear goal of the Hungarian 
political elite, spanning various governments. EU 
membership, supported by an almost complete social 
consensus, appeared as a “political desire” (Balázs, 2014). The 
turn away from the East and toward the West also determined 
the economic policy of the post-transition years, and this was 
meant to reduce the difference in economic development 
between Hungary and the “West”.   
* 
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The perceptions of social and economic players – the elite and 
the public – play a prominent role in our study. Institutions 
operate based on the perceptions of the actors that embody 
them (North, 1990). By the elite, we mean the minority that 
plays a leading role in society, for example in the economy 
and in political life, by possessing the decision-making and 
influencing positions (see Aron, 1950). On the basis of the 
new elite paradigm (Higly-Pakulski, 2000), we can assume 
that during the course of institutional changes (e.g. in the 
European Union), the elite plays a key role, as its movements 
can overwrite existing rules and regulations. 
* 
In the dissertation, following a review of the literature on the 
negative view towards integration, i.e. euroscepticism (e.g. 
Serrichio et al., 2013), we provide the essential background 
for the thesis about the development of the Hungarian 
economy from the democratic transition until EU accession, as 
well as the effect of the global economic and financial crisis 
started in 2008 on the EU. This is followed by empirical 
analysis on euroscepticism and economic performance, as well 
as the connection between the two. 
The research questions of the dissertation are the following: 
What dynamics and transformations did euroscepticism go 
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through in Hungary following EU accession in 2004? What 
reasons can the change in the attitude toward the EU in 
Hungary and Central Europe be attributed to? How has the 
performance of the Hungarian economy developed over the 
past decade, in a comparative perspective? How did the 
attitude toward the EU, and the development of 
euroscepticism, influence economic decisionmaking and 
economic performance in Hungary and in Poland? 
In the dissertation, we operationalized economic performance 
with the gross domestic product (GDP) produced by a country. 
Based on North (1991), by formal institutions we mean formal 
rules, such as laws, as differentiated from informal 
institutions, i.e. norms, traditions and customs. By institution-
building, we mean the process through which formal and 
informal institutions are created and which contribute in a 
relevant manner to a country’s economic performance. The 
abstract European Union values cannot be placed in the 
Northian conceptual framework. This is because, unlike the 
Northian informal institutions (i.e. the culture), the values of 
the “normative power” are itemized as external (exogenous) 
norms. Thus, we referred to the European Union values 
itemized in the treaties as norms in the Mannersian sense 
(Manners, 2002).  
The hypotheses of the dissertation are the following:  
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1. In accordance with utilitarian and pragmatic explanations 
(see for example Gabel, 1998) the public perception of 
economic performance in Hungary – in the decade 
examined, i.e. from 2004 to 2014 – may have been linked 
to the perception of the EU among the public.  
2.   Following the change in government in 2010 the criticism 
of the EU by the governing elite may have strengthened 
euroscepticism among the public, and led to its stronger 
forms.  
3. The relationship of the elite to the EU – through the 
violation of norms in the Northian (1990) and Mannersian 
(2002) sense – may have influenced the performance of 
the Hungarian economy: certain elements of economic 
policy and institutions may have become channels for the 
negative effects of euroscepticism. 
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The diagram of the dissertation is the following: 
 
II. Methodology  
During the course of our analysis, we used several research 
methods. 
We took the data on public perceptions and attitudes from the 
European Commission’s regular public opinion surveys – the 
Eurobarometer
1
 – that cover all of the member states, and 
subjected them to secondary analysis. Elite perceptions were 
                                                 
1
 Eurobarometer has been measuring the opinions and attitudes of European citizens since 
1973.  http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/ 
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quoted partly from the INTUNE
2
 study. The possible links 
between various perceptual and attitude variables in a time 
series were tested using correlation and regression analyses. 
From this, some conclusions on the transformations, causes 
and consequences of euroscepticism in Hungary compared to 
Central Europe were drawn.    
We also used the tool of media analysis to analyze the EU-
related statements of the Hungarian political elite, and within 
that of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in the period following 
EU accession. The content analysis allowed us to gain 
information how the Hungarian political elite has related to 
the EU. 
In a comparative analysis, we analyzed the main 
macroeconomic indicators of Hungary and that of the 
countries in Central Europe, mainly Poland. Using correlation 
analyses, our attempt was to reveal the possible links among 
three sets of indicators, EU-related attitudes, institutional 
variables and hard indicators. This method allowed us to 
explore certain links between economic performance and EU-
perceptions, for example how euroscepticism affected – 
directly or indirectly, through institutional variables – 
economic performance. 
                                                 
2 INTUNE: Integrated and United? A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe. An 
elite study supported by the European Union’s 6th Framework Programme. Data was 
collected in 2007 and 2009.    
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III. Conclusions of the Dissertation   
 During the years of the recent financial crisis, by 2012, 
partly but not solely due to the crisis, the perceptions about 
the EU reached a lowest point, both in Hungary and in the 
EU. This has been a relevant problem because in a post-
Maastricht Treaty Europe public opinion has become an 
important factor that could even block the process of 
European integration (“constraining dissensus”).   
 Post-EU-accession euroscepticism among the Hungarian 
public is a complex and paradoxical phenomenon. The 
vast majority of Hungarian society does not question the 
country’s EU membership, its attachment to Europe is 
above average, moreover, its European identity has 
increased in the decade following accession. Meanwhile, 
the number of those who believe the EU is a “good thing” 
and who “conjure up a positive image” of the EU 
gradually decreased between 2004 and 2012. The group of 
discontent people increased in this period, which suggests 
a pragmatic, utilitarian relationship, a “soft” 
euroscepticism.   
 The euroscepticism of the Hungarian governing elite since 
2010 is “hardening”, it is often adamant, emotional and 
isolationist, although in some respects contradictory. It 
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may point to the rhetorical nature of euroscepticism that 
despite the decisively anti-EU, “freedom fighting” 
vocabulary, Hungary – strictly in the formal sense – has 
remaining a law-abiding EU country even after 2010. 
 Following the decade after eastward expansion, opinion in 
Central Europe about the situation of the economy on one 
hand, and the perception on the EU, on the other, showed a 
strong correlation: euroscepticism among the public was 
linked to the perception economic performance. Among 
the countries Hungary and Poland are the two “extremes” 
of this connection. In Hungary, the view of the economy 
was consistently unfavorable, and furthermore the opinion 
about the EU was more negative than both the regional 
and the EU average. At the same time, in Poland the 
consistently favorable, above-average view of the 
economy was coupled with a consistently positive view of 
the EU.    
 An “EU-political paradox” prevailed in Poland and 
Hungary. The view of the EU was favorable in Poland 
even during the rule of the strongly anti-European 
Kaczynski government that was in power between 2005 
and 2007. At the same time, in Hungary, in the period of 
the Europhile Gyurcsány government, between 2004 and 
2009, the popularity of the EU in Hungary remained low. 
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Consequently, between 2004 and 2014, the perceptions of 
the public with regard to the EU did not depend primarily 
on the political declarations of the political elite. 
 When examining the development of euroscepticism in 
Hungary over the past decade, it is primarily the utilitarian 
explanations – their sociotropic and egocentric forms – 
that are relevant. Temporarily and conditionally, “political 
cueing” could have also played a role while forming 
opinion about the EU, although government’s hardening 
euroscepticism after the 2010 political shift did not break 
through to public opinion. 
 In the case of Hungary, the extremely negative public view 
of the economy – between 2004 and 2012 – was confirmed 
by the economy’s hard indicators. In the decade since EU-
accession Hungary has barely been able to converge to the 
EU average, while all the other countries that joined after 
2000 caught-up more dynamically. Hungary’s first decade 
in the EU was a lost decade from the viewpoint of 
economic performance.  
 Since 2001-2002 Hungarian economic policy has been 
going counter to textbook solutions for converging 
economies and the experiences of Central European 
countries. Between 2001 and 2006 the state budget deficit 
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ballooned due to an unprecedented wave of spending, 
which made convergence in terms of economic 
performance impossible on the longer term. The rift and 
the deep mistrust within the political elite could be 
possibly linked to the “fiscal alcoholism.” 
 In Poland, the pragmatic consensus of the political elite 
was able to catalyze a disciplined fiscal and a growth-
friendly economic policy. In Hungary the view on the 
economy and the EU became more politicized, and was 
much more aligned with political cycles than in Poland. 
This may be connected to the fact that in the past decade 
Poland was characterized by dynamic convergence to the 
core of the EU, albeit from a much lower level than in the 
case of Hungary. 
 Following the political shift in Hungary in 2010 the risks 
relating to the development of economic performance 
changed. Budget risks decreased, as the government 
consistently met the 3% deficit target. At the same time, 
the erosion of the rule of law and the transformed pattern 
of corruption led to an increase of institutional risks.   
 In the case of proxies that measure institutional quality of 
governance, such as indices approximating rule of law and 
corruption – as with regard to the development of 
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euroscepticism – the decade-long continuity prevailed: 
trends have worsened in Hungary since the beginning of 
the years 2000. The data do not reflect the political shift 
that occurred in 2010. 
 The shift in the political elite after 2010 toward harder 
euroscepticism and a defying of the European norms led to 
an erosion in the business environment and a drop in 
investments. This – until 2012 – caused a setback in 
economic performance. After 2012, economic 
performance improved, largely due to the large-scale 
inflow of EU funds. Over the entirety of the decade 
studied, the investment rate showed a correlation with the 
development of the rule of law: when the perception of the 
rule of law worsened, investments fell. Through the 
channels of formal (rule of law) and informal (corruption, 
transparency) institutions, the euroscepticism of the elite 
may have influenced economic performance, the 
worsening of which in turn may have led to an increase in 
the euroscepticism of the public. 
 In Hungary euroscepticism among the public in the decade 
after 2004 has shown a significant positive correlation 
with the development of the examined formal and informal 
institutions. In Hungary, rising euroscepticism has been 
coupled with worsening perceptions about the quality of 
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institutional factors. It is unclear, however, whether the 
deterioration in the quality of formal and informal 
institutions – above all, the rule of law – caused the 
decline in economic performance, or the reverse is true, 
i.e. weak economic performance led to the deterioration in 
the perception-based institutional indices. In this context, 
no discernible effect of the financial crisis that erupted in 
2008 and the political shift of 2010 can be demonstrated: 
the indicators deteriorated gradually during the examined 
decade.  
 In Hungary, the channel between euroscepticism and 
economic performance is represented by the quality of 
institutions. In Poland we did not find such a link.  
 Not only the institutions, but also the elite configurations 
also matter with regard to the economic performance. Elite 
plays a role in development, as they determine economic 
policy and – in part – institutional changes. 
* 
Our 1st hypothesis, which envisaged a correlation between 
utilitarian, pragmatic reasons – the view of the economy – and 
euroscepticism in Hungary, was confirmed. This correlation is 
valid with the restriction that following the political shift after 
2010, this interaction weakened significantly. The utilitarian 
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explanation could also be weakened by the fact that in a 
financial sense, Hungary has been one of the biggest 
beneficiaries of the EU. 
Our 2nd hypothesis – insofar as the direct effects of the 
governing elite’s attitude on public attitudes are concerned – 
was not confirmed. The governing elite’s euroscepticism did 
not break through in the direction of the public; its effect may 
have been merely indirect and conditional.  
The 3rd hypothesis was confirmed, as euroscepticism may 
have influenced economic performance through the channels 
of formal (rule of law) and informal (corruption, transparency) 
institutions. 
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